Injunction Against the Recording of Deeds Containing Racial Covenants: The Last of the Racial Covenant Cases? - Mayers v. Ridley by unknown
Maryland Law Review
Volume 34 | Issue 3 Article 5
Injunction Against the Recording of Deeds
Containing Racial Covenants: The Last of the
Racial Covenant Cases? - Mayers v. Ridley
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate
Commons
This Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Injunction Against the Recording of Deeds Containing Racial Covenants: The Last of the Racial Covenant Cases? - Mayers v. Ridley, 34 Md.
L. Rev. 403 (1974)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol34/iss3/5
INJUNCTION AGAINST THE RECORDING OF DEEDS
CONTAINING RACIAL COVENANTS:
The Last of the Racial Covenant Cases?
Mayers v. Ridley'
Pursuant to the mandate of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, four Caucasian couples owning real
property in the District of Columbia obtained an injunction,
against the District of Columbia Recorder of Deeds, permanently
enjoining the recording of deeds containing racial covenants.
Mayers v. Ridley extends the train of case and statutory law set
in motion in 1948, when Shelley v. Kraemer2 and its companion
case, Hurd v. Hodge,3 enjoined the specific enforcement of racial
covenants by state and District of Columbia courts, respectively.
Because the recording of deeds is an integral step in the modern
conveyancing process,4 the ban in Mayers on the recording of any
deed containing a racial covenant would seem to ensure the elimi-
nation of the already unenforceable racial covenant from modern
District of Columbia deeds.
The plaintiffs in Mayers (representing the class of all District
of Columbia landowners whose property has historically been
burdened by racial covenants)5 asked for declaratory judgment
and injunctive relief, including an injunction against the recorda-
tion of deeds which contain express racial covenants, and, with
regard to deeds which "incorporate" prior covenants by reference,
an order permitting the recordation of such "incorporating"
deeds only on condition that the deeds expressly exclude racial
covenants from incorporation.'
In the district court, the plaintiffs' complaint was dismissed.7
On appeal, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed,' but on rehearing en banc, the full
1. 465 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'g 330 F. Supp. 447 (D.D.C. 1971), briefly noted
in 9 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 159 (1972).
2. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
3. 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
4. Recording is necessary to protect a grantee against conveyances of interests in the
same land to subsequent bona fide purchasers. In Maryland, but not in most jurisdictions,
recording is necessary to pass legal title to an estate of more than seven years. MD. ANN.
CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 3-101(a) (1974). See generally L. SIMES, A HANDBOOK FOR MORE
EFFICIENT CONVEVANCING 18-31 (1961).
5. 465 F.2d at 630.
6. Plaintiffs' complaint at 2-4, Mayers v. Ridley, Civ. No. 3749-70 (D.D.C. 1971).
7. 330 F. Supp. 447 (D.D.C. 1971).
8. 465 F.2d at 630.
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court of appeals reversed in a terse per curiam opinion,9 accompa-
nied by two lengthy concurring opinions and two dissenting opin-
ions. 10 On remand, the district court enjoined the recordation of
"instruments that contain any [racial] covenant. . ."" ordered
the Recorder to place on the front cover of every liber volume "a
prominent legend which states: 'Racial covenants are null and
void and illegal under our laws' "" and ordered that all copies of
instruments furnished by the Recorder be stamped with such
warning legend.'" Neither the court of appeals nor the district
court's final order addressed itself to plaintiffs' demand that in-
struments which incorporate prior covenants by reference be per-
mitted recordation only on condition that such instruments ex-
pressly exclude racial covenants from incorporation.
9. The full opinion reads as follows:
PER CURIAM:
Appellants,- a group of District of Columbia residents representing the class of
homeowners whose property is burdened by racial covenants, instituted this suit
to enjoin the Recorder of Deeds from accepting such covenants for filing in the
future and to require the Recorder to affix a sticker on each existing liber volume
stating that restrictive covenants found therein are null and void. They also asked
for an injunction preventing the Recorder from providing copies of instruments on
file unless a similar notice is attached to the copies. The District Court dismissed
their complaint, 330 F. Supp. 447 (1971), and a three-judge panel of this court
affirmed that judgment. On reconsideration en banc of the judgment of the District
Court we now reverse.
Reversed and remanded.
Id.
10. Judges Bazelon and Robinson joined in Judge Skelly Wright's concurring opin-
ion. Judges McGowan and Leventhal joined in Judge Wilkey's concurring opinion. Judge
Tamm filed a dissenting opinion, with which Judge MacKinnon concurred in a separate
dissenting opinion.
11. Order dated Dec. 5, 1972, Mayers v. Ridley, Civ. No. 3749-70 (D.D.C. 1971). This
provision of the order necessarily requires the Recorder to scan all deeds for racial cove-
nants. The Recorder had contended that this would be an undue burden. 465 F.2d at 641.
However, since most deeds today are printed form deeds, racial covenants and other
special provisions usually would stand out clearly from the printed clauses. The Recorder's
clerks are experienced in skimming deeds to check the names of the parties, the land
description, and the type of conveyance, as part of their normal recording functions. The
additional burden of checking for racial covenants should not be onerous, unless the
court's order is construed as an absolute command to read each word of each deed.
12. Order dated Dec. 5, 1972, supra note 11.
13. Id. A visit by this writer to the Recorder's Office in February 1974 revealed that
the district court's order was not being fully obeyed. Personal inspection indicated that
many of the older liber volumes had not been stamped with a warning legend, while the
legend on many of the volumes actually stamped was misworded (using the word "unen-
forceable" rather than "illegal"). The writer requested a copy of a certain deed on file
(which contained a racial covenant), and the copy was furnished, with racial covenant and
without the required legend.
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HISTORY OF THE RACIAL COVENANT 4
Prior to Shelley, the judicial enforcement of racial covenants
had generally been upheld in those jurisdictions (nineteen states
plus the District of Columbia) 5 which had considered the ques-
tion. Courts for the District of Columbia were responsible for
some of the leading cases upholding judicial enforcement of the
covenants. 6 Of particular significance was the 1924 case of
Corrigan v. Buckley'7 in which the Supreme Court (without spe-
cifically passing on the constitutionality of judicial enforcement)
had allowed the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to
enforce a racial covenant.
In 1948 Shelley held that the enforcement of racial covenants
by state courts is a violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 8 Shelley's companion, Hurd v. Hodge,9
held that District of Columbia courts are prohibited from enforc-
ing racial covenants by section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 18660
and that federal courts should not be allowed to enforce racial
agreements when state courts are prohibited by the equal protec-
tion clause from enforcing such agreements.2'
14. For the history of the racial covenant prior to 1948, see T. CLARK & P. PERLMAN,
PREJUDICE AND PROPERTY: AN HISTORIC BRIEF AGAINST RACIAL COVENANTS (1969) (reprint of
the Dept. of Justice amicus curiae brief in Shelley v. Kraemer) [hereinafter cited as CLARK
& PERLMAN1. For a history through 1953, see C. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME
COURT, THE NAACP, AND THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES (1959) [hereinafter cited as
VOSEl.
15. CLARK & PERLMAN at 19. For example, in Maryland, judicial enforcement of
racial covenants was upheld in Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 196 A. 330 (1938),
noted in 2 MD. L. REv. 363 (1938). See also dicta in Scholtes v. McColgan, 184 Md. 480,
41 A.2d 479 (1944), noted in 8 MD. L. REV. 307 (1944), distinguishing between racial
restrictions on alienation (void) and racial restrictions on occupancy (valid).
16. Mays v. Burgess, 147 F.2d 869 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 868,
second appeal, 152 F.2d 123; Grady v. Garland, 89 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1937), cert. denied,
302 U.S. 694; Russell v. Wallace, 30 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 871 (1929);
Torrey v. Wolfes, 6 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir. 1925); Corrigan v. Buckley, 299 F. 899 (D.C. Cir.
1924), appeal dismissed, 271 U.S. 323 (1926). There were also "other cases in the District
Court not appearing in the case reports." VOSE, supra note 14, at 268 n.2. Cf. the statement
by Henry Gilligan, one of the lawyers arguing for enforcement of the racial covenant in
Hurd v. Hodge, in a warning letter to the Hurds prior to commencement of suit against
them, that the "District Court has granted two injunctions within the past two weeks in
cases brought by me." VOSE, supra note 14, at 74.
17. 299 F. 899 (D.C. Cir. 1924), appeal dismissed, 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
18. 334 U.S. 1, 18-23 (1948).
19. 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
20. Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, now codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
21. The Maryland Court of Appeals followed Shelley in Goetz v. Smith, 191 Md.
707, 62 A.2d 602 (1948), noted in 10 MD. L. REv. 263 (1949), reversing the enforcement of
a racial covenant by the circuit court.
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In 1953 in Barrows v. Jackson," the Supreme Court held that
the equal protection clause also prohibits the award of any dam-
ages by state courts for the breach of racial covenants. Justice
Jackson predicted in his majority opinion that this was the "last
stand" of the "unworthy covenant.""3
After 1953, racial covenants had no legally enforceable effect,
but they were in a practical sense merely voidable, rather than
void, because grantees were still free (until 1968)24 to discriminate
voluntarily in accordance with racial covenants in their title
deeds. Moreover, the making of racial covenants by grantors was
not forbidden either by Shelley or Barrows. Certain grantors, ac-
cordingly, continued to insert racial covenants in their
deeds25-motivated perhaps either by the over-cautious advice of
title insurance companies or lawyers, 6 or, when new subdivisions
22. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
23. Id. at 259. There still remained some doubt, after Barrows, about racial restric-
tions applied to property by means other than the racial covenant itself. In Charlotte Park
& Recreation Comm'n. v. Barringer, 350 U.S. 983 (1955), the Supreme Court denied
certiorari to a North Carolina decision which had upheld a racial special limitation im-
posed on the gift to the city of Charlotte of a golf course in fee simple determinable. The
state court had reasoned that the automatic termination of the estate upon the occurrence
of the event set out in the deed (use of the golf course by non-whites) was devoid of "state
action" and therefore constitutionally sound. 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955), criticized
in 8 HASTrNos L.J. 96 (1956) and 9 VAND. L. REV. 561 (1956). By contrast, the Supreme
Court of Colorado held in 1957 that the judicial ratification of a racial special limitation
on a determinable fee simple is clearly impermissible under Shelley and Barrows. Federal
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Smith, 136 Colo. 265, 316 P.2d 252 (1957). The cases are perhaps
distinguishable, in that the Colorado special limitation was part of the terms of a sale of
property, whereas the North Carolina limitation was part of the terms of a bona fide gift.
Compare the Supreme Court's holding in Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970), that there
is no discriminatory state action if the courts impose a resulting trust in favor of a settlor's
heirs where the purpose of the trust gift has failed because of the trust's unenforceable
racial terms. (A park had been devised in trust to a municipality for the benefit of whites
only). The case is criticized in Bogen, Evans v. Abney: Reverting to Segregation, 30 MD.
L. REV. 226 (1970).
24. See text accompanying notes 28-33 infra.
25. The New York Times on Nov. 2, 1957 stated that "such [racial] covenants
continue to be written into deeds here [in the District of Columbia] and are on file in
recorder's offices." Express racial covenants continued to be written into deeds at least
as recently as the late 1960's. For example, in Maryland, express racial covenants were
being inserted in certain subdivision deeds in the late 1960's. See Consent Order dated
Jan. 7, 1970, United States v. Owens, Civ. No. 20900 (D. Md.) ("Elmhurst" subdivision
in Anne Arundel Co.); Consent Order dated Jan. 26, 1970, United States v. M.E. Rockhill,
Inc., Civ. No. 21387 (D. Md.) (450-lot subdivision near St. Leonard, Md.). The inclusion
of express racial covenants in an Ohio subdivision in the late 1960's is evidenced by
Consent Order dated Jan. 19, 1970, United States v. Lake Lucerne Land Co., Civ. No.
069-885 (N.D. Ohio). All three orders are attached to Brief for Appellants at Appendix C,
Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630.
26. Until 1968, when all discrimination in the sale or rental of housing was unequivo-
cally banned by the decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), some
fears apparently lingered that a prior unenforceable racial covenant might amount to an
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were being developed,27 by the belief that purchasers would be
willing to pay more for lots in exclusive subdivisions which pur-
ported to be "protected" by racial covenants.
Undoubtedly, many laymen-grantees whose title deeds con-
tained racial covenants had never heard of Shelley or Barrows,
and a number of them must have thought that they were legally
bound by the agreements formally set out in their title deeds.
Even if a grantee had been knowledgeable enough to realize that
he was not legally bound to obey racial covenants, it might have
appeared to him to be a breach of "honor" for him to flout the
written "gentleman's agreement" expressly undertaken by him-
self and his neighbors on the face of the title deed. "Mere words"
(such as the legally inoperative words of a racial covenant) can
still obtain a psychological impact. Until 1968 there was no legal
bar to a grantee's succumbing to the influence of a racial cove-
nant.
In 1968 in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. ,2" the Supreme Court
construed 42 U.S.C. section 1982 as barring "all racial discrimi-
nation, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of prop-
erty." Thus Jones v. Mayer clearly prohibited voluntary per-
formance of the terms of a racial covenant. Furthermore, as the
Justice Department has argued,30 the broad prohibition in Jones
against all racial discrimination in the sale or rental of property
would seem to forbid the inclusion, in present conveyances, of
covenants demanding future discrimination (i.e., the making of
racial covenants).
Shortly before the decision in Jones v. Mayer Congress
encumbrance, which would make a grantor liable for breach of his covenant against
encumbrances. Two District of Columbia cases in the years immediately following Shelley
allowed black purchasers to rescind executory land contracts where they had not been
informed of prior racial covenants directed at the land. See Savage v. Parks, 100 A.2d 450
(D.C. App. 1953); Ralph D. Cohn, Inc., v. Trawick, 60 A.2d 926 (D.C. App. 1948). The
court's allowance of rescission was based on a finding that, even after Shelley, there
existed a "cloud of restriction" (100 A.2d at 451) or a "possibility of litigation" (60 A.2d
at 927). But see, Steuer v. Glevis, 243 So. 2d 453 (Fla. App. 1971), where purchasers, a
Jewish couple, were not allowed to rescind an executory land contract where the land was
burdened by a restriction against Jews; the court stated that such a restriction was
unquestionably void, and therefore did not give rise to grounds for rescission. Id. at 454.
An alternative, narrower, holding, based on a special proviso of the land purchase con-
tract, is possible. 243 So. 2d at 454.
27. See, e.g., the three 1970 subdivision cases, supra note 25.
28. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
29. Id. at 413. (Emphasis is that of Justice Stewart, speaking for the majority).
30. See Letter from Jerris Leonard, Ass't Att. General, Civ. Rts. Div., Dept. of
Justice, to the President of the Title Guarantee Co., New York, Nov. 26, 1969, attached
to appellants' Brief at Appendix C, Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630 [hereinafter cited as
Letter from Jerris Leonard].
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passed the Fair Housing Title of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,31
expressly outlawing most acts of discrimination in the sale or
rental of housing, including the
. . . mak[ing], print[ing] or publish[ing of] .. . any no-
tice, statement or advertisement, with respect to the sale or
rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation
or discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national
origin . . ..
The Department of Justice has argued that this portion of the
Fair Housing Title prohibits the making of racial covenants in
deeds. 33
In a more direct attack on racial covenants, a number of
jurisdictions in recent years have passed statutes or local ordi-
nances unequivocally prohibiting the making of racial covenants.
For example, in 1971, Maryland made it unlawful "[t]o include
in any transfer, sale, rental or lease of housing any restrictive
covenant that discriminates [on the basis of race.] ' '3 In the
District of Columbia, it has been unlawful since 1964 to
"[ilnclude in the terms or conditions of a transfer of an interest
in real property any clause, condition or restriction [which ra-
cially discriminates]",35 with violators subject to a fine of up to
$300 or imprisonment up to ten days.3 1
By 1970, before suit was brought in Mayers v. Ridley, it
might have seemed that the racial covenant had truly breathed
its last gasp, seventeen years after Justice Jackson in Barrows
had prematurely reported the covenant's "last stand". However,
a number of deeds drawn and recorded in the District of Colum-
bia after 1968, including the deeds held by the plaintiffs in
31. Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
3601 et seq. (1970)). For a recent discussion of Title VIII in the context of the general state
of the law against discrimination in housing, see Comment, Racial Discrimination in the
Private Housing Sector: Five Years After, 33 MD. L. REv. 289, 298-311 (1973).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1970). See generally Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative
History and a Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1969).
33. See Letter from Jerris Leonard, supra note 30.
34. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 22(6) (Supp. 1973). See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B,
§ 24 (Supp. 1973) (entitled "Restrictive Covenants Declared Void").
35. WASHINGTON, D.C., POLICE REOs. art. 45, § 3(b) (1967) (Comm'rs' order 63-2437,
Dec. 31, 1963, as amended). The Police Regulations are the functional equivalent of
municipal ordinances in other cities. Authority for such regulations is derived from the
congressional Joint Resolution of Feb. 26, 1892, D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-226 (1973). Article
45 is the D.C. Fair Housing ordinance.
36. WASHINGTON, D.C. POLICE REGs. art. 45, § 14 (1967). Congress has authorized the
D.C. legislative body to prescribe such penalities for violation of its regulations. D.C. CODE
ANN. § 1-224a (1973).
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Mayers, had cortained clauses stating that the deed was "subject
to covenants of record,"3 or that the deed was subject to the
covenants set out in certain cited prior deeds,3" and, in fact, racial
covenants were among the "covenants of record" affecting the
deeded property or among the covenants contained in the cited
deeds. In both situations, the present deed, by stating itself "sub-
ject to" prior covenants, thereby "incorporated" prior racial cove-
nants. 9 The continued execution and recordation in the District
of Columbia of such "incorporating deeds" was the occasion for
suit in Mayers v. Ridley.
THE DECISION IN MAYERS V. RIDLEY
The plaintiffs spent time, energy, and money litigating
Mayers through the court of appeals, apparently because they
were skeptical about the ability of prior case and statutory law
(including the District of Columbia anti-covenant ordinance) 0 to
ensure against the mischievous psychological effects of past and
present racial covenants in the housing field.
Although the plaintiffs asked for and obtained an injunction
37. For example, one of the plaintiff couples in Mayers held land under a 1970 deed
which was "SUBJECT TO Restrictive covenants ... of record." Deed dated Dec. 17,
1970, recorded at Liber 13169, folio 598, in the Recorder's Office, D.C. One restrictive
covenant of record, burdening the property in question, states that
no part of said land shall be sold to, occupied by, or used for residence or any other
purposes by negroes or persons of negro blood commonly called colored persons.
Deed dated July 26, 1938, at Liber 7258, folio 428, Recorder's Office, D.C.
38. For example, another one of the plaintiff couples in Mayers held under a 1968
deed which was "Subject to covenants and restrictions contained in a Deed dated May 9,
1933, and recorded . . . in Liber 6733 at folio 113." Deed dated Aug. 16, 1968, filed in the
Recorder's Office, D.C., at Liber 12913, folio 566. The particular prior deed which the 1968
deed refers to contains several pages of detailed restrictions, including:
Twelfth No part of the land hereby conveyed shall ever be used, or occupied by, or
sold, demised, transferred, conveyed unto, or in trust for, leased, or rented, or given,
to negroes, or any person or persons, of negro blood or extraction, or to any person
of the Semitic Race, blood or origin, which racial description shall be deemed to
include Armenians, Jews, Hebrews, Persians and Syrians, except that; this para-
graph shall not be held to exclude partial occupancy of the premises by domestic
servants ...
Deed dated May 9, 1933, recorded in Liber 6733, folio 113, at 116.
39. Such incorporation is probably inadvertent in many instances because the major
title insurance companies, in accordance with advice from the Civil Rights Division of the
Justice Department, have ceased reporting the existence of racial restrictions in the pre-
liminary reports prepared for their customers and have ceased including such restrictions
among the listed exceptions to the coverage of their insurance policies. See 465 F.2d at
642 n.14, 649. In the District of Columbia, the major title insurance companies are said
to be involved in 95% of all conveyances. Id. at 642 n.14. If an independent lawyer is the
drafter of a deed, and if he relies on a report by a major title insurance company, he will
not be aware that a racial covenant once burdened the property.
40. WASHINGTON, D.C., PoucE REGs. art. 45 § 3(b) (1967).
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against the recordation of deeds containing express racial cove-
nants, there is no evidence that any express racial covenants have
been inserted in any District of Columbia deeds since 1964, when
the insertion of such covenants was expressly banned.4 Of the
four named plaintiff couples in Mayers, all held under deeds
which merely "incorporated" prior racial covenants by reference,
under a clause neutral on its face which made the deed "subject
to covenants of record" or "subject to" the covenants in cited
deeds.4"
Plaintiffs must have genuinely feared that such incorpora-
tion of prior racial covenants by reference would be capable of
working mischief. Although it seems obvious that most grantees
will never come to realize the existence of racial covenants which
are technically incorporated into their deeds, the plaintiffs appar-
ently had in mind the limited number of situations where the
grantee is informed, by his broker or lawyer, or has personal
knowledge of the prior covenant,43 and, as a result, the otherwise
harmless "incorporating clause" in fact misleads the grantee
about the legal validity of the prior covenant or exerts a re-
inforcing influence on a grantee already predisposed towards ra-
cial discrimination.
The plaintiffs alleged no instance of the recordation of deeds
containing express racial covenants in the District of Columbia
in recent years, nor did they allege the likelihood of the recorda-
tion of such deeds in the future. The court should have refused
to consider the hypothetical issue of recordation of such deeds. By
entertaining such an abstract issue, the court may have violated
the constitutional case or controversy limitation on federal court
powers.4 By the same token, the court should have focused on the
41. Id.
42. See notes 37-39 supra and accompanying text.
43. In the District of Columbia, where the major title insurance companies are
involved in most conveyances, there is little chance of a grantee's being informed about
the prior racial convenant. (See note 39 supra). However, in other jurisdictions, particu-
larly small towns and rural areas, title insurance is less prevalent. For a state-by-state
statistical report (made in the 1950's) of the relative incidence of (1) title insurance, (2)
title searches by non-insuring abstract companies (whose abstracts are then evaluated by
the grantee's attorney), and (3) searches, abstracting and analysis done exclusively by the
attorney for one of the parties, see COMMIrrEE ON ACCEPTABLE TITLES TO REAL PROPERTY,
A.B.A. SECTION OF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST LAW, REPORT (pts. 1-2) at 47, 37
et seq. (1953-54). In 1966, it was estimated that 50% of conveyancing transactions in the
U.S. were assured through the non-title-insurance system of searches and abstracting by
abstract companies (or other professional abstractors), with title opinions thereupon is-
sued by independent attorneys. Fiflis, Land Transfer Improvement, 38 U. COLO. L. REV.
431, 438-50 (1966).
44. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The case or controversy question was neither raised by
the parties nor discussed by the court.
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factual issue concretely before it-the recordation of deeds incor-
porating prior racial covenants by reference."
The main thrust of the plaintiffs' suit was towards a prohibi-
tion on the future recordation of deeds which contain express
racial covenants on their faces, even though, in the District of
Columbia itself, there is no evidence that any such deeds had
been recorded in the seven years, at the least, prior to suit.
The district court in dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint held
that Congress intended that 42 U.S.C. section 3604(c) (prohibit-
ing the making or publishing of discriminatory statements with
regard to housing) apply only to persons actively involved in the
housing market, not to the Recorder of Deeds." The court of
appeals, en banc, reversed, with six of the ten judges holding that
section 3604(c) prohibits the Recorder's copying and public filing
of deeds containing racial covenants. 7 The same judges also held,
with lesser emphasis, that the prohibition in section 45-503 of the
District of Columbia Code4" against the recordation of "any in-
strument. . . not. . . executed. . . agreeably to law" embraces
a prohibition on the recordation of deeds containing (illegal) ra-
cial covenants. 9
Only three of the appellate judges expressly agreed with the
plaintiffs' constitutional argument that the official governmental
recordation of deeds containing racial covenants violates the con-
45. Apparently the court overlooked the concrete issue and decided a hypothetical
issue because it misinterpreted the facts alleged by the plaintiffs. The first sentence of
the district court opinion, 330 F. Supp. 447, states, "Plaintiffs are home owners in the
District of Columbia whose deeds to their homes, recorded with the D.C. Recorder of
Deeds, contain a racially restrictive covenant." This is inaccurate. The plaintiffs' com-
plaint and the plaintiffs' deeds themselves, as filed in the Recorder's Office, see notes 37-
39 supra and accompanying text, demonstrate that the plaintiffs' deeds did not "contain
a racial covenant," but rather, contained indirect incorporating clauses such as "subject
to convenants of record." Plaintiffs' complaint at 3, Mayers v. Ridley, Civ. No. 3749-70
(D.D.C.). Judge Skefly Wright's concurring opinion in the court of appeals perpetuates
the lower court's error. In 465 F.2d at 631 n.2, Judge Wright quotes two express racial
covenants and then erroneously states, "These are not ancient documents unearthed from
a now forgotten racist past. They are contained in modern deeds involving land transac-
tions occurring today in this city." In fact, the two quoted covenants are from deeds
recorded in 1921 and 1933 respectively. Plaintiffs' complaint at 2-4, Mayers v. Ridley, Civ.
No. 3749-70 (D.D.C.). The covenants are not "contained" in modern deeds; they are
incorporated by indirect reference into modern deeds. Elsewhere Judge Wright speaks of
modem deeds that "incorporate" provisions which are "brutally and disgustingly frank,"
but it is clear from the context that, by "incorporate", Wright contemplates the verbatim
copying of prior racial covenants into modern deeds-for which no evidence exists. 465
F.2d at 642.
46. 330 F. Supp. at 449.
47. 465 F.2d at 630.
48. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-503 (1973).
49. 465 F.2d at 636-37, 644-45.
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stitutional rights of minorities. 0 Three judges stated it was un-
necessary to reach the constitutional issue.5 Two judges expressly
disagreed with the plaintiffs' constitutional argument. Two
judges were completely silent on the issue.
SECTION 3604(c)
The plaintiffs' first major argument was that 42 U.S.C.
section 3604(c), derived from the Fair Housing Act of 1968, pro-
hibits the Recorder from "publishing" discriminatory "state-
ments" in the form of racial covenants. 3 The legislative history
of the statute indicates that the primary function of section
3604(c) was to prohibit the advertising of racial preferences by
prospective vendors and lessors of dwellings. But section 3604(c)
is not, by its terms, limited to vendors or lessors. As construed
by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in a case decided
prior to Mayers v. Ridley,55 the section makes it illegal for anyone,
including a newspaper publisher in his printing of want ads sub-
mitted by third persons," to "make, print or publish" any dis-
criminatory "notice, statement or advertisement" with regard to
the sale or rental of housing.
In accord with the Fourth Circuit's broad construction of the
statute, a majority of the appellate judges in Mayers held that the
Recorder's reproduction of deeds containing racial covenants and
his filing of the reproductions in his Office "for all the world to
see" would amount to the kind of "printing" or "publication" of
a discriminatory "notice" or "statement" forbidden by 3604(c).
Surely the court engaged in reasonable statutory construc-
tion. An express racial covenant on the face of a deed can reasona-
bly be construed as a "statement" which "indicates" a racial
50. Id. at 637-40.
51. Id. at 643.
52. Id. at 657-60.
53. Of course, such a prohibition could apply only to the Recorder's actions of
"making, printing or publishing" after April 11, 1968, the effective date of the Fair Hous-
ing Act.
54. Id. at 635 n. 25, 657.
55. U.S. v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972).
56. The court in Hunter found that a Maryland newspaper violated section 3604(c)
by printing classified ads for the rental of an apartment "[in private white home." Thus,
under section 3604(c), it is not necessary for an ad to specifically say, "only whites may
buy"; rather, in the language of the section, it is enough if the "notice, statement or
advertisement . . . indicates any preference . . . or discrimination." (emphasis added).
See also Holmgren v. Little Village Community Reporter, 342 F. Supp. 512 (N.D. Ill.
1971) (injunction against newspaper's publishing ads expressing preference for renters
able to speak certain languages).
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"preference" in the "sale or rental of a dwelling," and the recor-
dation of such a covenant in the public office of the Recorder can
reasonably be construed as an act of publication. But when the
Recorder officially records a mere "incorporating deed" such as
any one of the deeds held by the named plaintiffs in Mayers,57 can
it reasonably be said that a deed which declares itself to be "sub-
ject to covenants of record" or "subject to the covenants con-
tained in X deed" thereby "indicates [a racial] preference . . .
or discrimination . . .?
If it were common knowledge that a large number of proper-
ties in a given area historically have been burdened by racial
covenants, then the statement "subject to covenants of record"
might be interpreted as a "code phrase" which clearly "indi-
cates" a racial preference. However, many people today are seem-
ingly unaware of the historically widespread impact of the racial
covenant in urban and suburban areas. In most contemporary
cases it would seem that a general incorporating clause in a deed
does not meaningfully "indicate" racial preference or discrimina-
tion.
On the other hand, the word "indicate" generally means
"[tlo point. . . to, to direct to a knowledge of.""9 An incorporat-
ing clause in a deed does "point to" or "direct to" prior covenants
in the Recorder's Office, including prior racial covenants. A deed
"subject to covenants of record" can be said to "indicate" the
racial discrimination expressed in covenants of record. Thus sec-
tion 3604(c) can, linguistically, be interpreted as forbidding the
recordation of deeds incorporating prior racial covenants. Should
it be interpreted that way? The question arises: what was the
purpose of Congress in passing section 3604(c)?
The primary purpose of Congress in passing the section was
to prohibit discriminatory advertising by sellers and lessors of
dwellings. 0 There is no evidence that the specific intent of Con-
gress included a prohibition on the recordation of deeds contain-
ing racial covenants. But neither primary nor specific intent
should be determinative. The controlling standard should be the
general purpose or objective of the statute, as limited by express
provisos.6' In the first sentence of the Fair Housing Act, Congress
made its overriding purpose clear: "It is the policy of the United
57. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 2-4, Mayers v. Ridley, Civ. No. 3749-70 (D.D.C.).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1970) (emphasis added).
59. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1265 (2d ed. 1934).
60. 465 F.2d at 652 n.25, 657.
61. See generally HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS, 1144-1417 (Tentative ed.
1958).
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States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair hous-
ing throughout the United States."62 It is for the courts to deter-
mine which interpretation of section 3604(c) best promotes the
goal of fair housing.
In the area of civil rights legislation, a broad reading of the
statutory language is usually considered to.be most in keeping
with the congressional intent to remedy the deeply-embedded
evils of inequality. 3 Any linguistically-reasonable interpretation
of section 3604(c) which would reasonably promote fair housing
should be allowed. Certainly, a prohibition on the public recorda-
tion of express, nakedly discriminatory racial covenants would
reasonably promote fair housing, for it would eliminate: the en-
couragement to discriminate which overt racist language gives;
the likelihood that some grantees would believe themselves le-
gally obligated, or at least legally permitted, to discriminate; and
the deterrent effect of such unneighborly language upon prospec-
tive minority purchasers.
Whether a prohibition on the recordation of "incorporating"
deeds would reasonably promote fair housing is a closer question.
In the great majority of contemporary cases, such a prohibition
would probably have no effect in promoting fair housing, because
most grantees under incorporating deeds probably have no idea
that racial covenants have been incorporated into their deeds. On
the other hand, there probably still exist a small number of trans-
actions in the United States in which the grantee is aware of prior
racial covenants. In such cases, the incorporating clause in the
grantee's deed might encourage the grantee to discriminate, by
reinforcing either the grantee's legal ignorance or his propensity
to disobey knowingly the laws against discrimination. As dis-
cussed earlier, it would be linguistically permissible to interpret
section 3604(c) as prohibiting recordation of deeds which "indi-
cate" discrimination in their incorporating clauses. The extent to
which fair housing would be promoted by such an interpretation,
however, appears minimal. If the court had addressed itself to the
subject of "incorporating deeds," as it should have done, it pro-
perly could have refused to enjoin the recording.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970).
63. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298,
307-08 (1969).
64. See notes 39 and 43 supra.
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SECTION 45-503 OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CODE65
As a subsidiary holding, six of the appellate judges agreed
that section 45-503 of the District of Columbia Code, which re-
quires the Recorder to reject all instruments "not . . . executed
and acknowledged agreeably to law," requires the Recorder to
reject deeds containing racial covenants. Because the making of
racial covenants is expressly forbidden in the District of Colum-
bia (with violators subject to criminal penalties)," the Mayers
court had some basis for holding that a deed whose drafting in-
volves such illegality has not been "executed . . .agreeably to
law." However, a closer look reveals that, by "executed and ac-
knowledged agreeably to, law," Congress merely referred to the
formal requisites of a validly executed deed, such as the signature
of the grantor and a proper acknowledgement.
Another District of Columbia Code provision, section 45-701,
provides that the Recorder "shall . . .record all deeds . . .and
other instruments in writing affecting the title or ownership of
real estate . . .which have been duly acknowledged and certi-
fied. '6 7 This section prescribes the recordation of all deeds which
satisfy the certain minimal, formal criteria. In order to reconcile
this section with section 45-503, it is necessary to interpret "exe-
cuted . . . agreeably to law" in section 45-503 as referring merely
to the formal requisites of a valid execution. Because Congress
originally passed the two sections concurrently in 1901,8 and be-
cause Congress has allowed the two sections to exist together for
over fifty years, there is a strong presumption in favor of reconcil-
ing the two sections. Therefore, even though the inclusion of a
racial covenant in a deed is illegal, a formally executed and ac-
knowledged deed containing a racial covenant has been "exe-
cuted . . .agreeably to law" within the meaning of section 45-
503. Thus, under a proper reading of the section, contrary to the
reading by a majority of the judges in Mayers," section 45-503
does not require the Recorder to reject deeds containing racial
covenants .0
65. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-503 (1973).
66. See notes 35 and 36 supra and accompanying text.
67. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-503 (1973).
68. Both sections were contained in ch. 854, 31 Stat. 1275, Mar. 3, 1901.
69. 465 F.2d at 636-37, 644-45.
70. In general, it would be absurd to expect clerks to reject all instruments contain-
ing any illegal clauses, because clerks are not qualified to pass on the legality of clauses.
Any legislation prohibiting the recording of illegal clauses would have to define the kinds
of illegal clauses forbidden.
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RECORDATION AS A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OR EQUAL PROTECTION
The plaintiffs' third major contention was that the Recor-
der's copying and public filing of deeds containing racial cove-
nants would significantly involve the District of Columbia gov-
ernment in the discrimination present on the faces of the deeds,
contrary to the due process clause of the fifth amendment, as it
encompasses equal protection.7' Only three of the ten appellate
judges in Mayers expressly agreed with this contention."2
In raising an equal protection claim, the plaintiffs had to rely
on key Supreme Court decisions of the preceding decade. In 1961
in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority7 3 wherein a private
restaurant had been discriminating racially on premises leased
from a municipal agency, the Supreme Court had held that
privately-initiated racial discrimination is within the reach of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment if it can be
shown that the State has become involved in the private conduct
"to some significant extent."74 Whether governmental involve-
ment is "significant" is to be determined, under Burton, "by
sifting facts and weighing circumstances."75 In 1967, in Reitman
v. Mulkey,7" the Supreme Court had overturned a state constitu-
tional amendment which had repealed all existing state laws
against housing discrimination and had barred any future laws
limiting "the right of any person . . . to decline to sell [real
property] . . .to such . . . persons as he, in his absolute discre-
tion, chooses."77 The Court held that the amendment encouraged
private housing discrimination (then considered constitutionally
permissible in and of itself), 8 so as to amount to impermissible
state involvement in private discrimination.
Indisputably, the actual recording of deeds is "action" by an
agency of the state. The problem is determining whether or not
recordation of a deed containing either an express racial covenant
or an "incorporating" covenant is discriminatory state action,
i.e., whether or not the state becomes significantly involved in the
71. Cf. the following language in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954): "The
Fifth Amendment . . .does not contain an equal protection clause ... [but] discrimi-
nation may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process."
72. 465 F.2d at 637-40.
73. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
74. Id. at 722.
75. Id.
76. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
77. Id. at 371 n.2.
78. It was not until 1968 that the Fair Housing Act and Jones v. Mayer prohibited
private discrimination. See discussion in text accompanying notes 28-33 supra.
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private discrimination present on the face of the deed (under
Burton) or encourages such discrimination (under Reitman)
through recordation.
It might seem that there is no significant governmental in-
volvement or encouragement of discrimination when the Record-
er files a deed containing a racial covenant, because, as argued
in one of the dissenting opinions in Mayers, the Recorder's Office
is merely a passive receptacle, or "repository", or "safety deposit
box" for the records filed in his Office.7" Such an argument, how-
ever, misses the essentially public nature of recordation.
In the District of Columbia, the Recorder's files are, by stat-
ute, open to the general public, free of charge.80 Recordation
serves the active, public function of giving binding "constructive
notice" of a deed's contents (including covenants) to various per-
sons, including subsequent purchasers of the affected land.8' Re-
cordation effectively publishes the contents of a deed. Where pri-
vate discrimination in the form of a racial covenant is overtly
present on the face of a deed, recordation of the deed is significant
involvement in the orginally private discrimination, because it
converts the once-private covenant into a matter of public notice.
The government becomes "infected" by publicizing the offensive
language of racial covenants. Such express publication is a consti-
tutionally impermissible encouragement of private discrimina-
tion.
The Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Moose Lodge v. Irvis,2
79. 465 F.2d at 658.
80. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-705 (1973).
81. The statutes of many jurisdictions do not specifically mention such "construc-
tive notice," but it is nevertheless a basic theoretical underpinning of conveyancing law
in all jurisdictions. The following statutes are among those that expressly refer to the legal
notice that recordation gives:
The record of a grant, deed or instrument . . . authorized . . . to be recorded
. . . shall be notice to all persons of the existence of such grant, deed or instrument.
Amiz. Ray. STAT. § 33-416 (1956) (emphasis added).
Every conveyance of real property . . . recorded as prescribed by law . . . is
constructive notice of the contents thereof to subsequent purchasers and mortga-
gees ....
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1213 (1954) (emphasis added).
Deeds, mortgages and other instruments of writing relating to real estate shall
be deemed, from the time of being filed for record, notice to subsequent purchasers
and creditors.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 30 (Smith-Hurd 1969) (emphasis added).
The Maryland statutes, while not directly adverting to constructive notice, do provide
that recordation is necessary to pass legal title to an estate of more than seven years. MD.
ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 3-101(a) (1974). Thus, in Maryland, recordation of a deed
containing a racial covenant is an even clearer instance of "state action" than ordinary
notice-giving recordation.
82. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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might be read as limiting the Burton "significant governmental
involvement" test. In Moose Lodge the Court held that a state's
granting of a liquor license to a discriminatory social club is not
significant involvement. Whether or not Moose Lodge actually
conflicts with prior trends, Mayers is distinguishable from it. In
Moose Lodge the Court emphasized the continuing private nature
of the club being granted the liquor permit,"3 whereas the basic
purpose of recording is to make the once private acts of the parties
"public and notorious." Furthermore, the private social club in
Moose Lodge arguably brought into play first amendment inter-
ests in privacy and free association. The regulation of transfers
of real estate and the recording of deeds, not such a sacrosanct
area, has increasingly come to be considered a public sector. An
example is the recent interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of
1866 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968 to reach all discrimination
in the sale or rental of housing.
It is also well to bear in mind the patently racist language of
express racial covenants. It is proper for the courts to consider the
adverse psychological impact of the governmental publication of
such demeaning language upon minorities. 6
Significantly, however, while there are valid reasons to pro-
hibit the recordation of deeds containing express racial cove-
nants, where deeds, such as the plaintiffs' deeds in Mayers,
merely incorporate prior racial covenants by reference, the fact
that there is nothing discriminatory on the face of the deed and
that in most cases no one will discover that a racial covenant has
83. "In short, while [the restaurant in Burton] was a public restaurant in a public
building, Moose Lodge is a private social club in a private building." Id. at 175. See also
the parties' stipulation quoted in Justice Douglas's dissent, id. at 179 n.1.
84. The majority opinion does not specifically advert to the rights of privacy and
association, although it emphasizes the private nature of the lodge. Justice Douglas's
dissent does expressly weigh the first amendment values involved. Id. at 179-80.
85. For analysis of a conflict between first amendment associational rights and
rights against racial discrimination involving real property, see Note, Closing the Back
Door to the Discriminating Private Club, 32 MD. L. REv. 128 (1972), treating Tillman v.
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 431 F.2d 1211 (4th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 410 U.S. 431
(1973), where a discriminatory private club gave membership preferences to residents
within a three-quarter mile radius.
86. In Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court took into account the
psychological effect upon minorities of a dual school system. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Daniel
v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969), the Supreme Court spoke with approval of congressional
intent, in passing the Equal Accommodations Title of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 "to
remove the daily affront and humiliation" to blacks. Id. at 307 (emphasis added). In
Bryant v. State Board of Assessment, 293 F. Supp. 1379 (E.D.N.C. 1968), a three-judge
panel enjoined the keeping of separate tax records by race, stating, "The keeping of public
records according to race, absent a legitimate public purpose . . . is itself . . . an
indignity upon the minority group. . . .Id. (emphasis added).
[VOL. XXXIV
RACIAL COVENANTS
technically been incorporated supports a finding that the recor-
dation of such incorporating deeds does not significantly impli-
cate the state in racial discrimination.
CONCLUSION
The court in Mayers considered the apparently moot issue of
whether deeds containing express racial covenants may properly
be recorded. The Recorder needlessly asserted his right to record
express racial covenants, emphasizing the bureaucratic difficul-
ties involved in plaintiffs' suit. All the Recorder needed to do was
to argue plaintiffs' failure to produce evidence that express racial
convenants are in fact being recorded in the District of Columbia.
Conversely, the Mayers court failed to consider the factual
issue actually before it, namely, the recording of deeds which
indirectly "incorporate" prior racial covenants. This practice
does continue today, both in Maryland"7 and the District of Col-
umbia, but prior racial covenants are so buried in the Recorder's
files that the recordation of contemporary "incorporating deeds"
is not reasonably enjoinable.
Although the court's factual assumptions were erroneous, its
holding of law retains some precedential potential. The case
stands, specifically, for a broad construction of 42 U.S.C. §
3604(c), forbidding the making or publishing of discriminatory
statements, including express racial covenants, with regard to the
sale or rental of housing.
87. See, e.g., deed dated June 22, 1972, recorded in the Land Records of Baltimore
City at Liber R.H.B. 2921, folio 93, which makes itself "Subject to restrictions in Liber
S.C.L. 4301, folio 278." In fact, one of the restrictions on the cited deed reads "this
property shall never be rented or sold to or for the use of persons of the negro race .
Liber S.C.L. 4301, folio 278, Land Records of Baltimore City (1924).
Compare the more careful wording of a mortgage dated Oct. 1, 1973, recorded at Liber
R.H.B. 3066, folio 789, in the Land Records of Baltimore City, which, at folio 790, states
itself "subject to the legal operation and effect, if any, of conditions, covenants ... and
charges set forth in a Deed. . . in Liber S.C.L. No. 2829, folio 1 .. " (emphasis added).
One of the covenants of the earlier deed is in fact a racial covenant. Liber S.C.L. 2829,
folio 3, Land Records of Baltimore City ( ). The specific language of the 1973 deed
appears to exclude effectively the racial covenant from incorporation.
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